| The question which arose for consideration
in this case is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application to set
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
The submission of the Appellant was that Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 makes the provisions of Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to special laws like
the Act of 1996, since the Act of 1996 did not expressly exclude
its applicability and there was sufficient cause for the delay
in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 reads as under:
“An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or,
if a request had been made under section 33, from the date
on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Appellant
and held that had Section 34(3) merely provided for a period
within which the court could exercise its discretion, that
would not have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24
of the Limitation Act, 1963. But the crucial words “but
not thereafter” used in Section34(3) of the 1996 Act
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and would therefore bar
the application of Section 5 of that Act.
Apart from the language used in Section 34(3) “express
exclusion” may follow from the object of the special
or local law. The history and scheme of Act of 1996 support
the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section
34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendible under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Arbitration and
Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the Act of 1996 stated
as one of its objectives the need “to minimise the supervisory
role of courts in the arbitral process”. This objective
has found expression in Section 5 of Act of 1996 which reads
as under:
“5. Extent of judicial intervention – Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority
shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”
The importance of the time limit fixed under Section 34(3)
is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of
1996 which states that “…the award shall be enforced
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner
as if it were a decree of a court”. Thus if there were
any residual doubts on the interpretation of the language
used in Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996, the scheme of the
Act of 1996 would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment
of the court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
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